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Abstract 
We examine the impact of board heterogeneity on the performance of EU listed banks in the wake 
of the global financial crisis. In a comprehensive set-up, we consider standard board features (type, 
tenure, size, and age of board members) as well as board diversity features (gender diversity, 
employee representation, internationalisation, and age diversity). We propose a diversity index, 
which summarises the different dimensions of diversity and control for unobserved heterogene ity 
and reverse causality. Our analysis uncovers a complex relationship between board heterogene ity 
and bank performance, which is influenced by market conditions and by national culture. Overall 
board diversity does not seem to affect bank performance, but it does decrease performance 
variability during the Eurozone crisis and in countries culturally more open to diversity. Different 
board and diversity features have a positive impact on bank performance (size, tenure, and 
employee representation); the relationship is non-linear, with the effect of diversity being more 
relevant when there is a significant proportion of minority representatives. While substantial board 
internationalisation has a negative impact on bank performance, the presence of foreign directors 
appears to be less detrimental during the Eurozone crisis and in countries that are more welcoming 
towards diversity. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper investigates whether board heterogeneity impacts on bank performance and its 
variability. The global financial crisis emphasised flaws in bank corporate governance, which are thought 
to have played a key role in promoting and rewarding excessive risk-taking. These views prompted a 
discussion, both in academic and policy circles, about the role of bank corporate governance structures for 
financial stability. Bank governance has been at the centre of recent academic work which aimed at 
identifying the most effective structures (see, among others, Mehran et al., 2011; Adams and Mehran, 2012; 
Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). Policymakers have also responded to the perceived shortcomings of the existing 
governance structures with a series of initiatives, most of which included an emphasis on increased 
diversity. At the EU level, the crisis prompted a revision of the comprehensive corporate governance rules 
already in place, either in the form of directives or in the form of European regulation, to promote a culture 
that does not reward excessive risk-taking.3 CRD IV (a EU directive covering prudential rules for banks) 
includes changes to rules on corporate governance, including remuneration, and introduces standardised 
EU regulatory reporting. Among the enhanced corporate governance rules, CRD IV requirements promote 
diversity in board composition, although it falls short of imposing quotas. The European case is of particular 
interest. Many of the post-crisis governance reforms explicitly emphasise the importance of diversity in the 
boardroom. Most of these initiatives are based on the view that more diverse boards, with an increased 
presence of women and ethnic minorities, would positively affect the governance of companies. One 
argument is that boards could enhance their effectiveness by tapping broader talent pools for their directors. 
Nevertheless, evidence suggests that these affirmative actions aimed at improving the participation of 
women and minorities in high profile roles have had little impact. This has led several European regulators 
to go a step further and recommend gender quotas for publicly listed companies  ´boards. An often-quoted 
example is the Norwegian case. In 2003, the Norwegian Parliament passed a law requiring all public limited 
companies to have at least 40 per cent of women on their boards of directors. After voluntary compliance 
failed, the requirement became law in 2006, with a two-year transition period and liquidation as a penalty 
for non-compliance. Following Norway’s example, other European countries, including Belgium, France, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Germany, have since promoted legislation aiming to increase gender 
diversity on corporate boards via the imposition of quotas. In 2012, the European Commission (EC) 
proposed legislation with the aim of attaining a 40 per cent participation rate for the under-represented 
gender in non-executive board-member positions in publicly listed companies by 2020. However, the 
regulatory framework of EU member states is still very fragmented, with some countries arguing against 
mandatory quotas. In addition, sanctions for non-compliance with gender balance also vary substantially 
among EU member states. 
                                                 
3 The 2010 European Commission Green Paper on Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions was part of 
an increased effort to address the problem of corporate governance. The European Banking Authority (EBA) issued 
a set of guidelines, including Guidelines on Internal Governance (September 2011) EBA Guidelines ha ve since been 
implemented by Member States’ banking supervisory authorities. In 2017, the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA) issued joint guidelines with EBA on the assessment of the suitability of members of the 
management body and key function holders. 
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We exploit this heterogeneity in board diversity in EU countries to test the impact on bank 
performance. Our aim is to provide evidence on whether board diversity, in aggregate and along different 
dimensions, increases boards’ monitoring ability and promotes a culture that focuses both on increased 
performance and decreased performance variability, our proxy for risk. While the recent focus of both 
academic studies and legislative efforts has been on diversity in the context of gender, in fact, diversity 
comes in many different forms. We therefore consider a broader range of diversity features such as gender 
diversity, employee representation, internationalisation, and age diversity, and investigate the effect of each 
one on bank performance. In addition to examining each characteristic separately, we aggregate the 
diversity measures into an index to identify the overall level of board diversity. Following Li and Wahid 
(2017), we construct an index based on the proportion of women, employees, and international members 
within each board of directors as well as the extent of age variability, with the aim to capture a board overall 
diversity (and its changes) at the bank level. Finally, we investigate whether cultural differences at the 
country level explain at least part of the heterogeneity in the impact of board diversity on the performance 
of EU banks. In this respect, we consider a country’s openness to diversity and rely on the six cultural 
dimensions proposed by Hofstede (1983) and Hofstede et al. (2010), that is, power distance, individualism, 
masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation, and indulgence. To summarise these cultural 
differences, we collect data from the 2010 extension of the original Hofstede study on how values in the 
workplace are influenced by culture and derive an overall index as the average value of the six Hofstede 
dimensions. In so doing, we build upon a stream of the literature that focuses on the links between national 
culture and accounting discretion for earnings management (Kanagaretnam et al., 2011) and accounting 
conservatism and risk-taking (Kanagaretnam et al., 2014). 
More in detail, we aim to address the following research questions: (i) Do standard board 
characteristics (type, tenure, size, and age of board members) impact on bank performance? (ii) Does board 
diversity, proxied by our diversity index, impact on bank performance? (iii) Do board diversity 
characteristics (gender, employee representation, internationalisation, and age diversity) impact on bank 
performance?  
To answer these questions, we collect detailed information on board characteristics of 77 publicly 
listed EU banks over the period 2007-2015. We focus on listed banks because of the assumption that these 
institutions are subject to more stringent regulatory controls and compliance requirements; it also augments 
data availability in terms of board composition and enhances cross-country comparability. In addition, 
publicly listed banks share internationally adopted accounting standards (IFRS). Finally, the recent changes 
to corporate governance regulation and codes of conduct affect mostly publicly listed companies, including 
banks. We collect data on traditional board features including, type, size, tenure, and age, and diversity 
features, including gender diversity, employee representation, internationalisation, and age diversity. 
Establishing a causal relationship between board diversity and firm performance is challenging. 
The literature has documented that board characteristics are not exogenous random variables but are 
endogenously chosen by firms (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Sila et al, 2016). 
Two sources of endogeneity are potentially likely to bias our estimates of how board diversity affects bank 
performance: omitted variable bias and reverse causality. Omitted variable bias may arise because 
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empirical models cannot possibly capture all the determinants of bank performance. In addition, the 
direction of the causal relation is unclear ex-ante. Female and minority directors can self-select into a 
particular type of bank, either a more profitable or a less risky bank whose existing management is more 
aligned with their views. On the other hand, more profitable banks may choose to appoint more women 
and, generally, more diverse boards. In our context, the above issues would imply that current boardroom 
diversity is determined by past performance. To account for these possible endogeneity issues, we take the 
following steps. First, we address endogeneity caused by omitted variable bias by using bank-specific 
controls (for example, size as larger banks may have more diverse boards) and by using country fixed 
effects to account for unobserved country-specific characteristics that are time-invariant and may be 
correlated with the level of bank diversity (that is, a country’s corporate culture). Second, to mitigate 
endogeneity caused by reverse causality we use lagged values of the regressors. Finally, we use a dynamic 
panel data model, namely, the two-step dynamic panel system generalised method of moments (GMM), 
with instruments.  
The results of this analysis are both relevant for policymakers and contribute to the academic 
debate. They can help shed some light on the effect of group composition on board effectiveness by 
evaluating the likely success of governance proposals fostering greater diversity or the possible failure of 
initiatives where tokenism prevents minority directors from having an impact on corporate outcomes. We 
find evidence that standard board characteristics affect bank performance; specifically, we find that board 
tenure and board size have a positive impact. Secondly, overall board diversity does not seem to affect 
bank performance, but different diversity features have a positive impact. Specifically, the presence of 
employee representatives on the board has a positive impact on bank performance, whereas age diversity 
has a negative impact. There is evidence of non-linearity in the impact of board composition on 
performance. Employee representatives increase firm value, but their merit ceases to exist when reaching 
a high proportion over the total board members. On the risk side, diversity features seem to play a role only 
when there is a significant proportion of minority representatives. While substantial board 
internationalisation has a negative impact on bank performance, the presence of foreign directors seems to 
be less detrimental during the Eurozone crisis, a period when overall diversity positively affected bank 
performance. When controlling for a country’s cultural characteristics, we find that overall board diversity 
decreases risk and the negative effect of board internationalisation disappears in countries more open to 
diversity. Our results are consistent for a range of alternative proxies for bank performance. 
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it complements the literature on the 
impact of corporate governance on bank performance, which mostly focuses on either profitability or risk, 
by examining different dimensions of bank performance. Further it contributes to the literature on board 
diversity by considering different dimensions of diversity, including gender diversity, employee 
representation, internationalisation, and age diversity. Finally, we also extend the prior literature on 
corporate governance by adding a cross-country dimension whereas most existing empirical evidence is 
based on single country studies.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature; 
Section 3 introduces the data used for the empirical analysis and our variable definitions. Section 4 
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delineates the research design and Section 5 presents the results of our empirical analysis. Finally, Section 
6 concludes. 
2 Literature Review 
The board of directors of a firm is responsible for its major strategic and financial decisions (for 
example, approval of mergers and acquisitions and changes in capital structure) and for ensuring that its 
franchise value can survive outside shocks. The literature identifies three main functions of the board: (i) 
the monitoring function; (ii) the advisory function; and (iii) the resource provision function (Adams et al., 
2010; Oxelheim et al, 2013); and states that the ability of the board to perform the above-mentioned 
functions depends crucially on the complexity of the operational structure of the firm and on the conditions 
of the external environment.  
To the extent that the board of directors plays a role, the evidence from the existing studies on the 
relationship between board characteristics and firm performance is mixed (Faleye et al., 2011; Adams and 
Mehran, 2012; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). Among board characteristics, diversity plays a crucial role in 
aligning the interest of management and shareholders and a vast literature supports the hypothesis of 
diversity enhancing the board of directors’ monitoring and advising roles (Fields and Keys, 2003; Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 2003). The main argument to support diversity is that a more diverse management team 
tends to be more creative, more innovative and may consider a wider range of alternatives when making 
decisions. In addition, more diverse boards should protect minorities, guarantee differing opinions are 
considered, and be harder to manipulate. There appears to be a meaningful relationship between diverse 
boards and improved corporate financial performance, and diverse boards can help companies more 
effectively recruit talent and retain staff (SEC, 2010). However, diversity may also bring costs: 
heterogeneous boards may be less efficient; the decision-making process may be slower and the likelihood 
of reaching consensus may be smaller (Carter et al., 2003; Carter et al., 2010).  
A review of the earlier literature on the relationship between board composition and corporate 
performance is provided by Conyon and Peck (1998). Existing research has mostly focused on a single 
aspect of board diversity, for example, gender diversity (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Carter et al., 2010; 
Adams and Funk, 2012; Mateos de Cabo et al, 2012; Bennouri et al, 2018) or the nationality of directors 
(Oxelheim et al., 2013). Because of the focus on gender and nationality of previous studies, one cannot 
make more general inferences about the influence of board diversity. The overall impact of board diversity 
on performance remains relatively unexplored, with a few exceptions. Hagendorff and Keasy (2012) 
examine the value of board diversity in the US banking industry and find evidence that it has the potential 
to create shareholder value in the market for corporate control. Huyghebaert and Wang (2017) investigate 
corporate governance mechanisms for a large sample of Chinese listed firms and provide some evidence 
that experienced independent directors contribute to value creation. We seek to expand the existing analyses 
by controlling for a wider range of diversity measures, including gender diversity, employee representation, 
internationalisation, and age diversity.  
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With some exceptions, most studies have excluded financial firms from their analysis due to their 
regulated nature. Further, the studies that have investigated the impact of board diversity on bank 
performance have focused mainly on the US (see, among others, Adams and Funk, 2012; Hagendorff and 
Keasey, 2012; Sila et al., 2016) or on a single country (for example, Berger et al., 2014). The impact of 
board diversity on European banks’ performance has received less attention, with a few exceptions (Mateos 
de Cabo et al., 2012; Garcia-Meca et al., 2015; Farag and Mallin, 2017). Based on a detailed panel data set 
on Finnish cooperative and savings banks, Kauko (2009) analyses the impact of managers’ age and 
education on bank efficiency and find that university graduates, particularly those with degrees in business 
administration or economics, have a comparative advantage in running relatively large banks. On the other 
hand, the analysis also indicates that managers with vocational level qualifications in business 
administration improve cost efficiency for small banks. King and Williams (2016) also investigate the 
impact of education and find that CEO educational attainment, both level and quality, matters for bank 
performance. Their study indicates that CEOs with MBAs outperform their peers, particularly when 
managing large and complex banks. 
In the wake of the financial crisis, bank boards have made an increasing number of appointments 
from a wider range of backgrounds in terms different demographic, educational, and social backgrounds 
with a view of improving performance and decreasing risk-taking incentives. We argue that diversity comes 
in many different forms and we therefore consider a broader range of features, including gender diversity, 
employee representation, internationalisation, and age diversity to evaluate the impact of both overall 
diversity and of each specific diversity feature on bank performance. Our starting point in this paper is to 
investigate the importance of board diversity for bank performance outcomes. In doing so, we provide 
evidence that different aspects of diversity matter for bank performance and show the contribution of each 
diversity feature. In addition, we posit that the impact of board diversity is influenced by a country’s culture 
and openness to diversity. 
3 Data and variable definition  
3.1 Data 
To examine the relationship between corporate governance and bank performance we use data on 
publicly listed commercial banks from EU countries over the period 2007-2015. Listed banks are subject 
to more stringent regulatory controls and compliance requirements and report following the internationally 
adopted accounting standards (IFRS), which enhances cross-country comparability. Our sample period 
starts in 2007, at the onset of the global financial crisis. This allows us to investigate the relationship 
between corporate governance and bank performance during the global financial crisis (2007-2009) and 
the subsequent Eurozone crisis (2010-2015). 
The dataset is compiled from several sources. First, we collect data on corporate governance 
features of publicly listed banks in the 28 EU countries from BoardEx. We then match the BoardEx data 
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with the banks’ balance sheet and income statement data collected from Bankscope (now Orbis Bank) and 
stock market data retrieved from Datastream (now Thomson Eikon).  
In constructing the sample, we exclude banks with missing total assets or board data; we further 
restrict the sample to banks with at least three years of observations over the sample period. This selection 
strategy yields a final sample of 77 publicly listed banks from 20 EU countries over the period of 2007-
2015, which covers around 50 per cent of the total assets of these countries’ banking systems.4   
3.2 Variables 
The variables used in the analysis include bank performance indicators, board characteristics, bank-
specific and country-specific control variables. A detailed outline of the variables follows below along with 
a summary table of definitions and sources in Appendix 1. 
3.2.1 Bank performance  
Following the extant literature, we use the stock market annualised daily return (SR) as our measure 
of bank performance and its standard deviation (SDSR) as our proxy for performance variability or risk 
(see, among others, Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). In additional tests, we consider alternative measures of bank 
performance, such as the return on assets (ROA; Bennouiri et al, 2018); the net interest margin (NIM; 
Kanagaretnam et al, 2014), and a widely used measure of bank solvency, the z-score (LNZSCORE; Anginer 
et al, 2017). 
3.2.2 Board characteristics 
We collect data the on board features of banks including: (i) standard board features, that is, type, 
size, tenure, and age, and (ii) board diversity features, that is, gender diversity, employee representation, 
internationalisation, and age diversity. Below we discuss the board features used in this study in detail.  
Standard board features 
Our first standard board feature is board type (DBOARDTYPE); we focus on the presence of a sole 
(or one-tier) versus a dual (or two-tier) board system. A sole board combines both the monitoring and the 
advising roles, whereas those are separated in a dual board system. While a one-tier structure is thought to 
favour information sharing, a two-tier structure can minimise interference from large shareholders (Adams 
and Ferreira, 2007).  
The second standard board feature is board size, measured as the logarithm of the number of 
members on the board (LNBOARDSIZE). Board size is another factor perceived to affect a board’s ability 
to monitor and advise the management. On the one hand, several studies have hypothesised a negative 
relation between board size and firm performance (Jensen, 1993; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). As board 
size increases, boards become less effective at monitoring management because of free-riding problems 
amongst directors, increased decision-making time, and coordination issues. On the other hand, larger 
                                                 
4 See Appendix 3 for the details of the sample composition.  
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boards can potentially bring more expertise and they might also result in less extreme decisions as they 
have to reconcile various opinions in the decision-making process and hence lead to lower variability in 
firm performance (Coles et al., 2008). In the financial services industry, however, the results on the 
relationship between board size and performance are mixed; possible explanations refer to regulatory 
issues, informational asymmetries, and organisational structure (Eisenberg et al., 1998; Adams and 
Mehran, 2003, 2012; Boone et al., 2007; Andrés and Vallelado, 2008; Cheng 2008; Harris and Raviv, 2008; 
Linck et al., 2008). 
Our next standard board feature of interest is board tenure, measured as the logarithm of the average 
board tenure length (LNBOARDTEN). Board stability plays a role in the execution of boards' duties. Longer 
tenure may have a positive effect, leading to managerial stability and deeper knowledge of the bank’s 
business model. This, in turn, could help the board carry out both the advisory and the monitoring tasks 
better. In addition, as longer tenure is linked to higher entrenchment, an established board should be able 
to counterbalance more effectively a CEO’s power. However, longer tenure can also signal lower board 
dynamism (Schleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
Finally, we include board age, measured as the logarithm of the average board members’ age 
(LNBOARDAGE). The relationship between board age and firm performance is unclear, with the positive 
findings related to the use of age as a proxy for experience. 
Board diversity features 
Gender diversity 
To examine the impact of gender diversity on bank performance, we use the ratio of the number of 
female directors on the board to the total number of board directors (BOARDWOM2). Despite the 
importance of gender diversity in the policy debate, women hold hardly any corporate board seats. Many 
proposals for governance reform explicitly refer to the importance of gender diversity in the boardroom, 
often suggesting the need for gender quotas. Most of these initiatives are based on the view that the presence 
of women could significantly affect the governance of companies. Arguments in favour are that boards 
should not exclude female talents and that women are less entrenched and more independent. However, the 
effect of gender diversity on performance is mixed (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Dezso and Ross, 2011; 
Garcia-Meca et al., 2015). Ahern and Dittmar (2012) use the mandatory introduction of gender quotas in 
Norwegian listed firms as a natural experiment to analyse the impact of quota on firm valuation. The 
authors find a large negative impact of the mandated board changes on firm value, because younger and 
less experienced members enter the board, thus reducing the effectiveness of the board tasks. On the same 
case, Garcia-Lara et al. (2017) find that the changes in monitoring are not primarily driven by the 
introduction of gender quota, but by changes in the professional characteristics of board members, such as 
experience and age. 
Employee representation  
To assess the effect of employee representation on bank performance, we use the ratio of the 
number of employee representatives to the total board members (BOARDEMPL2). The presence of 
9 
employees on the board is controversial, with some studies claiming it is detrimental to shareholder value. 
Employee representation provides workers and trade unions with reliable information about a firm's 
strategy and profits; this should reduce conflicts in the workplace thereby minimising the risk of strikes 
(Adams and Ferreira, 2007). However, excessive employee representation could lead firms to operate in 
the employees' interest, against shareholders’ interest. Seeking to maximise perks and payroll instead of 
stock prices, employees can become a source of agency costs.  
Internationalisation 
We capture board internationalisation by the ratio of foreign directors on the board to total board 
members (BOARDNATMIX2). A higher number of foreign directors is frequently recommended by 
corporate governance codes of good practice, based on the commonly held view that directors coming from 
different countries increase board independence and hence foster better performance. Foreign directors 
have weaker or no associations with senior executives and major shareholders and should therefore be less 
biased, particularly when evaluating existing business practices and monitoring management. The positive 
influence of foreign directors on firm performance is not without critics, with arguments stating that foreign 
directors are not involved in the creation of a firm’s long-term value (Adams and Ferreira, 2012; 
Fahlenbrach et al., 2017). 
Age diversity  
Finally, we consider the impact of board age diversity on bank performance. We use the coefficient 
of variation for board age (CVBOARDAGE) to capture the dispersion of age within the board. Age diversity 
has the potential to enhance board performance, because directors of different ages will, to some extent, 
have different backgrounds, skills, experiences, and social networks. By increasing the age diversity of the 
board of directors, the board’s aggregated human and social capital can be maximised (Carter et al., 2010). 
On the other hand, Westphal and Zajac (1995) argue that CEOs prefer to work with demographically similar 
board directors. Thus, CEOs who can influence the directors’ nomination process will try to hire directors 
who are demographically similar to themselves. However, corporate boards with similar demographics can 
be prone to group thinking and therefore be less efficient in their monitoring function, for instance aligning 
their compensation to (higher) CEO compensation (Westphal and Zajac, 1995). Empirical evidence relating 
to this type of diversity is limited and the results are mixed. While age diversity may be beneficial, its 
positive influence rests on the assumption that demographically different directors will hold differing 
perspectives (Li and Wahid, 2017). 
Diversity index 
We measure the overall degree of board diversity by constructing a bank-specific board diversity 
index (BOARDDIVX) based on the proportion of women, employees, and foreign directors within each 
board of directors as well as the extent of age variability. Specifically, we first convert our four board 
diversity variables (BOARDWOM2, BOARDEMPL2, BOARDNATMIX2, and CVBOARDAGE) into 
discrete score variables ranging from 1 to 10 based on the decile of the sample distribution they fall into 
(with 1 being the bottom and 10 the top decile). The diversity index for each bank-year is computed as: 
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where 𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑗
 is the decile for bank-year observation it on the j th diversity variable (j =1,2,3,4). In the case 
where all diversity variables are zero the index is set at zero and, hence, 1/40 standardises the index within 
the range of 0 – 1. 
Our index captures the overall gender, employee representation, internationalisation, and age 
diversity and is inspired by Li and Wahid (2017) who develop a similar measure in the context of tenure 
diversity. The construction of the index meets the four criteria that have been laid out for a good diversity 
measure: (i) it has a zero point to represent complete homogeneity, (ii) it is positively related to diversity, 
(iii) it does not assume negative values, and (iv) it is bounded. In addition, our index is a suitable measure 
of diversity for categorical variables that are skewed in a proportion of one category (that is, gender or 
employee representation), as mapping onto deciles mitigates the impact of large values.5  
3.2.3 Bank-specific features 
We control for a set of bank-level characteristics that are commonly related to bank performance 
(Adams and Santos, 2006; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Kanagaretnam et al., 2014; 
Garcia-Meca et al., 2015). Specifically, we include bank size measured by the natural logarithm of total 
assets (LNTA). We also control for the possible effect of bank growth on performance by including total 
asset growth (TAGA). Next, we control for asset composition using the loan to asset ratio (LOANTA); and 
for the quality of the loan portfolio using the loan loss provision ratio (LLPLOAN). We also control for 
funding sources by including the deposit and short-term funding to total assets ratio (TDTA). We account 
for the impact of capital on bank performance by including the capital to total assets ratio (ETA). Finally, 
we control for the bank operating efficiency proxied by the cost to income ratio (CI).  
3.2.4 Country-specific features 
To account for country-specific group heterogeneity we employ either country fixed effects or 
country-specific variables. In particular, the latter include the size of the economy of a country, measured 
by the natural logarithm of gross domestic product per capita (LNGDPC) (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; 
Kanagaretnam et al., 2014); the concentration of the banking system, measured by the Herfindahl 
Hirschman Index (HHI) (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Kanagaretnam et al., 2014); 
a proxy for a country’s financial development, that is, the size of the capital markets, assessed by the natural 
logarithm of the country’s market capitalisation (LNCMC); and, the heterogeneity of the legal systems 
captured by a dummy variable which takes the value of one for common law countries (Kanagaretnam et 
al., 2014).  
Cultural differences may explain part of the heterogeneity in board diversity in different EU 
countries. For example, empirical studies focusing on firm demand for female directors underline the role 
                                                 
5 In contrast, the Blau index that could be used as an alternative measure of diversity based on the degree of 
heterogeneity among board members with respect to the different attribu tes is unsuitable for skewed categorical 
variables (Blau, 1977). 
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of a country’s socio-political beliefs and attitudes towards women, work, and families, the gender historical 
role in the government, public and private initiatives in increasing the possibility of individual woman’s 
career progression (Terjesen and Singh, 2008; Terjesen et al., 2016).  
To account for differences in national culture in relation to a country’s openness to diversity, we 
rely on the six cultural dimensions originally proposed by Hofstede (1983) - power distance, individualism, 
masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation, and indulgence - which have been endorsed by 
later studies as good indicators of the extent to which a society supports diversity (Newburry and Yakova, 
2006; Chakrabarty, 2009). For instance, a society that welcomes individualism, long-term orientation and 
indulgence in the form of deviations from strict social norms is associated with a greater support of 
diversity. In contrast, a society where masculinity, power concentration, and uncertainty avoidance prevail 
is considered to be less open to diversity. We collect data from Hofstede et al. (2010) and derive an overall 
index (HOF) as the average of the six Hofstede dimensions.6 While our index represents a snapshot of a 
country’s cultural openness to diversity at a particular point in time (that is, at the beginning of our sample 
period) and cultural aspects change over time, attitudes and beliefs transform over generations and therefore 
the overall change in national culture is slow.  
3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the selected board, bank-specific and country-specific 
characteristics over the sample period. The bank-specific controls are winsorised at the 99 per cent level of 
their bank-year distribution. Panel A reports data on the full 2007-2015 sample period for performance 
measures and on the 2007-2014 sample period for the other variables. Looking at performance and 
performance variability, the sample banks, on average, have a stock return of 7.1 per cent with a yearly 
standard deviation of 42 per cent and a return on assets of 0.4 per cent with a 3-year standard deviation of 
0.5 per cent. On average, most boards have a two-tier structure and are formed by 16.3 directors who stay 
in charge for 5.9 years. Female directors are present in 82.1 per cent of boards, whereas employee 
representatives are present in 30.2 per cent and foreign directors in 65.4 per cent of boards, respectively. 
However, on average, boards have only 2 female directors, or 12.6 per cent of total board members, whereas 
employee representatives and foreign directors constitute 8 per cent and 19.8 per cent of the board, 
respectively. The average age of the board directors is 57.5 years, while the coefficient of variation for 
board age is 15 per cent. In terms of balance sheet structure, our sample banks have an average size of 
around 333 billion euro, of which 57.1 per cent is invested in loans; their main source of funding is deposit 
and short-term liabilities (65.3 per cent of total assets), while only around 6.5 per cent of their total assets 
is funded by equity capital. As for country-specific characteristics, most countries adopt a civil law system, 
their average GDP per capita amounts to around 28 thousand euro, the average country market 
                                                 
6 The values of our Hofstede index range from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating countries more open to 
diversity. For power distance, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance, greater openness to diversity is indicated by 
lower values; hence we use (100 – Dimension’s value) when constructing the Hofstede index.  
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capitalisation is around 1.1 trillion euro, and the average Herfindahl Hirschman index is 7.4 per cent. 
Standard deviations for these variables are high, suggesting a high heterogeneity in the sample. 
< Insert Table 1 about here > 
In Table 1, Panel B, we test for differences in the means of board features between the top-quartile 
and bottom-quartile performing banks, based on their average annualised stock return. The boards of the 
top performing banks are, on average, more diverse. They appear to have more female directors and a 
higher proportion of foreign directors.  
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the board characteristics by country. We document 
significant cross-country heterogeneity in the boards of the sample European banks. Looking at standard 
board features, banks in Germany have the largest boards (22.7 members), while the smallest boards are in 
the Netherlands (7.9 members). The longest board tenure is observed in Hungary (11.3 years), while the 
shortest in Ireland (3.2 years). Banks in Hungary also have the highest average board members’ age (61.3 
years), whereas those in Malta have the lowest (51.9 years). 
< Insert Table 2 about here > 
Turning to board diversity, the greatest overall diversity is observed in bank boards in Austria 
(diversity index of around 0.7), closely followed by those in Germany, Czech Republic, and Sweden, while 
banks in Hungary have the least diverse boards (diversity index of around 0.1). In terms of gender diversity, 
all banks in the Czech Republic, Denmark, Lithuania, and Sweden have at least one female director on the 
board; banks in Sweden also show the highest presence of female directors (31.6 per cent), while the lowest 
is observed in Hungary (around 1.1 per cent). In the Czech Republic and Denmark all bank boards have at 
least one employee representative on the board; however, the greatest employee representation is observed 
in Germany (33.9 per cent). The greatest board internationalisation is in Romania, where all banks have at 
least one foreign director and the highest presence of foreign directors (40 per cent); on the other hand, 
banks in Hungary, Lithuania, and Malta have only domestic directors. Finally, the data show the greatest 
age diversity of the board in the Netherlands (20.9 per cent) and the lowest in Malta (8.3 per cent). 
The last column of Table 2 reports the value of the Hofstede index, our proxy for a country’s 
openness to diversity. Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands show the greatest openness to diversity, 
whereas Romania, Portugal, and Poland appear to have a national culture least open to diversity.  
4 Empirical strategy 
Our main research question is whether board diversity plays a role in explaining the performance 
of banks. We hypothesise that board characteristics such as type, size, tenure, and age impact on bank 
performance. In addition, we hypothesise that greater board diversity related to gender, employee 
representation, internationalisation, and age of directors influences bank performance. This section 
delineates our empirical specification and considers the two potential sources of endogeneity that are of 
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concern in empirical studies on the relationship between board features and firm performance – unobserved 
heterogeneity and reverse causality.  
4.1 Fixed effects model  
The following baseline model is deployed as our main vehicle for empirically testing the hypothesis 
of whether board characteristics impact on bank performance: 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 ∙ 𝛽 + 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 ∙ 𝛾 + 𝜂𝑖+𝜀𝑖𝑡 i = 1, 2,…,N   t =1, 2,….,T 
(1) 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 refers to the performance measure of bank i in year t, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 is a matrix containing the k  board 
features, 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 is a matrix containing the m bank-specific control variables. The (1 + k  + m) coefficient 
vector (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾) is to be estimated. The error term 𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝜂𝑖+𝜀𝑖𝑡 is assumed to be independent from the k  
board-specific regressors and the m bank-specific controls. The noise εit is assumed identically and 
independently distributed, whereas the time-invariant component 𝜂𝑖 represents unobserved firm-specific 
heterogeneity. The model controls for time effects through a full set of yearly dummies. Country-specific 
group heterogeneity is accounted for by using either country fixed effects or country-specific variables. 
The use of fixed effects helps to mitigate biases caused by time-invariant omitted variables correlated with 
the regressors, which result in inconsistent parameter estimates. Country-specific effects capture the latent 
influence of country corporate culture that is likely to be correlated with bank board diversity. Country- as 
opposed to firm-level fixed effects are employed as an appropriate way to mitigate omitted variable bias 
while avoiding unreliable slope estimates caused by firm-specific fixed effects absorbing most of the 
variation across firms. The use of lagged regressors also helps to alleviate some of the endogeneity 
concerns. The covariance structure of the estimated coefficients is clustered at the firm level to allow for 
within-bank correlation over time.  
In additional analyses, we investigate whether the effect of board characteristics on performance is 
non-linear and, in particular, whether a board diversity feature, such as the presence of foreign directors, 
has a disproportionately greater impact in boards where it is more prevalent. We do so by considering 
thresholds computed as sample averages for each board feature.7  
We also examine whether the impact of the standard and diversity board features becomes stronger 
during the period of the Eurozone crisis through the interaction of the board characteristics with a Eurozone 
crisis dummy that takes the value of 1 over the crisis period. 
Finally, we examine whether board diversity features play a bigger role in countries that are 
culturally more open to diversity through the interaction of board diversity features with a Hofstede dummy 
that takes the value of 1 for countries with the Hofstede index value above the sample mean. 
                                                 
7 For instance, the average proportion of foreign directors on the board of our sampled banks over the period 
is 8%, which is used as a threshold to consider whether the role of foreign directors is more pronounced in banks 
whose boards are substantially more international (i.e., the number of foreign directors exceeds the threshold).  
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4.2 Two-step dynamic panel generalised method of moments  
Another possible source of endogeneity when investigating the relationship between board 
diversity and performance is reverse causality stemming from the fact that the choice of board composition 
could rely on current and past realisations of performance and risk. For instance, better performing firms 
may have greater gender diversity. In addition to past realisations of performance and risk, the extent of 
board diversity is a choice that can be influenced by bank- and board-specific characteristics and 
unobserved factors, for example, more complex firms with bigger boards may opt for more diversity. As 
performance and risk are correlated over time, this induces correlation between the residuals and the 
regressors and thus inconsistency of the fixed effects estimator in the case of fat (short-T, large-N) panels.  
Bearing in mind the aforementioned issues, the Dynamic Panel System – Generalised Method of 
Moments (DPS-GMM) proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) lends itself 
naturally as the appropriate empirical framework to estimate the relationship between board diversity and 
performance. The intuition is that in order to determine their board composition, banks rely on past 
performance as well as other board and bank characteristics. As the information set underlying the decisions 
is not correlated with the unexpected error term, these variables can be used as instruments for board 
appointment decisions. The model augments that in equation (1) as follows: 
𝑷𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 ∙ 𝜷 + 𝒁𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 ∙ 𝜸 + ∑ 𝜹𝒋𝑷𝒊𝒕−𝒋
𝒒
𝒋=𝟏
+ 𝜼𝒊+𝜺𝒊𝒕   
(2) 
where q = 1 in our analysis. We deploy a two-step estimation approach using as instruments the lag of all 
independent variables and include yearly time effects. The reported t-statistics are based on Windmeijer’s 
(2005) corrected standard errors that are robust in the presence of uncertainty stemming from two-step 
estimation for small panels.  
Given the challenges in identifying a unique truly exogenous instrument, our identification relies on 
the fact that all factors affecting board composition are either included in the board characteristics or in 
past values of performance and risk. We compute the Arellano-Bond (1991) test for no autocorrelation in 
the differenced residual series. Autocorrelation indicates that lags of the dependent variable (and any other 
not strictly exogenous variables used as instruments) are endogenous, thus bad instruments. The second 
order autocorrelation is the one of relevance as presence of first order dependence in the residual first 
difference (Δ𝜀𝑖𝑡) is guaranteed by definition through the common term 𝜀𝑖𝑡−1. Finally, the joint validity of 
the instruments is assessed by using the Hansen and Singleton (1982) test.  
5 Empirical results 
The main aim of our analysis is to examine the link between board characteristics and bank 
performance and performance variability. In our first model specification we address our first research 
question and examine whether standard board characteristics impact on bank performance. To do so we 
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regress the relevant bank performance measure on the type of board, board tenure, board size, and average 
age of board members. Moving to our second research question, we investigate whether board diversity 
impacts on bank performance by augmenting the model with our diversity index. In our third model 
specification, we decompose the index into its constituent board diversity dimensions (gender, employee 
representation, internationalisation, and age diversity) and look at their individual impact on bank 
performance to answer to our third research question.  
5.1 Effects of board characteristics on bank performance 
The regression results of the models in Equation (1) that investigate the impact of standard board 
features and board diversity on bank performance and performance variability are shown in Table 3. In 
column (1), we examine the effect of standard board features on annualised stock returns (SR) and returns 
standard deviation (SDSR), in columns (2)-(3) we add the diversity index, and in column (4) we replace the 
index with the individual board diversity variables. All specifications use bank-specific control variables, 
and account for time- and country-specific fixed effects. The model in column (3) does so using country 
control variables rather than fixed effects. The results are qualitatively similar; therefore, we conduct the 
rest of the analysis using country fixed effects. The estimated coefficients on the bank and country control 
variables exhibit the expected signs. 8 
< Insert Table 3 about here > 
We find that among the standard board features the size of the board (LNBOARDSIZE) is positively 
associated with SR, suggesting that larger boards improve bank performance. Our findings are in line with 
the strand of the literature that promotes the view that larger boards can potentially bring more experience 
and knowledge and hence offer better advice, particularly for larger and more complex firms such as banks 
(Coles et al, 2008). In addition, board size does not seem to impact on performance variability. Board tenure 
(LNBOARDTEN), on the other hand, while not impacting upon bank performance, seems to have a positive 
effect on performance variability, which is significant in our specification with country-specific controls, 
indicating the benefit of board stability for managerial effectiveness. This result is in line with the literature 
that posits that the tenure of board members affects their level of firm-specific knowledge and expertise 
and that time on the job improves board effectiveness (Celikyurt et al. 2014).  
Turning to board diversity, the results show that the overall diversity of the board, as measured by 
the diversity index, is not related to bank performance. However, looking at the component board diversity 
features, we find that the presence of employee representatives (BOARDEMPL2) reduces bank risk, which 
is consistent with the view that it may allow boards’ preferences to be more aligned with those of managers 
(Adams and Ferreira, 2007). On the other hand, the presence of foreign directors (BOARDNATMIX2) 
increases bank risk. While there has been a "pro-internationalisation shift" in board composition in recent 
years, the empirical evidence is mixed. The positive influence view of foreign directors is not shared by 
all, with arguments stating that foreign directors are less involved in the creation of a firm’s long-term 
                                                 
8 Correlations between the variables used in the analysis are reported in Appendix 2. 
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value; other critics claim their understanding of the firm's business might be limited and their contribution 
might be negligible at best or negative. Adams and Ferreira (2012) document that outside directors have 
more attendance problems at bank board meetings and find evidence of free-riding. Fahlenbrach et al. 
(2014) document a dark side of outside directors and find evidence to suggest that they have incentives to 
resign to protect their reputation or to avoid an increase in their workload when they anticipate that the firm 
will perform poorly or disclose adverse news. Our results so far seem to provide support for a less positive 
contribution of the presence of foreign directors on bank boards. Finally, we find that gender diversity does 
not impact either bank risk or performance.9 
However, it could be argued that the impact of board features on bank performance might be non-
linear. The literature has uncovered a U-shaped relationship between board size and performance and 
between the proportion of non-executive directors and performance. De Andres and Vallelado (2008) show 
that larger and not excessively independent boards create more value; however, this relationship is non-
monotonic and when the board reaches a certain size, firm value decreases. Similarly, they find that outside 
directors increase firm value, in line with board size, but destroy value when reaching a higher proportion 
over the total board members. Huang and Hilary (2017) uncover a U-shaped relationship between board 
tenure and firm value and accounting performance, which is consistent with the interpretation that directors’ 
on-the-job learning improves firm value up to a threshold, at which point entrenchment dominates and firm 
performance suffers. 
We argue that diversity may become relevant only when minority voices reach a certain threshold 
and its impact becomes bigger when the proportion of minority representatives becomes more prevalent. 
For instance, the voice of women might become more effective in boards where the gender diversity is 
already significant. We explore the presence of this type of non-linearity through the use of thresholds for 
the board features, which implies differential effects when the relevant board variable is above or below a 
certain level. Table 4 reports the estimation results, where a suffix UP or DN added to a board variable 
indicates the interaction between the board variable and a dummy for its value above or below the sample 
mean, respectively. As before, in Model (1) we use thresholds for the standard board features only and 
control for bank-specific variables; in Models (2)-(3) we use thresholds for the diversity board features 
while controlling for the standard board features and bank-specific variables. 
< Insert Table 4 about here > 
The results show that the estimated performance benefit incurred by larger boards is non-linear and 
only documented when the board size is bigger than average, with the above the threshold board size 
variable (LNBOARDSIZEUP) showing a positive and statistically significant association with stock returns. 
Looking at board diversity, the results show non-linearity in the impact of employee representation on bank 
performance. In particular, we find that the positive contribution of employee representatives reaches a cap, 
as it becomes insignificant after the proportion of employees exceeds the threshold. On the risk front, we 
                                                 
9 To ensure that our findings are not driven by the performance of Italian banks, we re-run the analysis without 
Italian banks in the sample and the results are broadly consistent. 
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also find that the estimated positive effect of employee representation holds only when the presence of 
employee representatives on the board is higher than average (significance of BOARDEMPL2UP). 
Interestingly, we find similar non-linearity in the estimated risk effect of board internationalisation, where 
the latter impacts on risk only when the proportion of foreign directors on the board is relatively large 
(significance of BOARDNATMIX2UP). This negative effect is consistent with the evidence of De Andres 
and Vallelado (2008) that show that, when reaching a high proportion over the total board, outside directors 
decrease firm value. 
We next examine the impact of the Eurozone crisis on the relationship between board features and 
bank performance. The estimation results are reported in Table 5. In Model (1) we include our standard 
board features and their interactions with the Eurozone crisis dummy (the latter is equal to 1 for years 2010-
2014 and zero for years 2007-2009) and control for bank-specific characteristics; in Models (2)-(3) we 
examine our board diversity features and their interactions with the Eurozone crisis dummy, while 
controlling for the standard board features and bank-specific characteristics.  
< Insert Table 5 about here > 
The key finding that emerges from the Eurozone crisis analysis is that board diversity reduces 
variability in performance during the crisis period. In particular, the results of Model (2) suggest that the 
overall board diversity reduced bank risk during the Eurozone crisis (ECBOARDDIVX is negatively 
associated with SDSR). The results of Model (3) further suggest that the risk-reducing effect of board 
diversity during the Eurozone crisis is mainly driven by the change in the effect of board 
internationalisation (ECBOARDNATMIX2 is negatively associated with SDSR), which becomes less 
aggravating. As far as standard board features are concerned, older than average boards seem to increase 
bank performance variability during the Eurozone crisis, as indicated by the results of Model (1) which 
show a positive association between ECBOARDAGE and SDSR. 
Finally, we examine whether a country’s national culture with respect to openness to diversity has 
an impact on the association between board diversity features and bank performance. Table 6 reports the 
estimation results. In Model (1) we include the diversity index and its interaction with the Hofstede dummy 
(the latter is equal to 1 for countries more open to diversity and zero otherwise) while controlling for the 
standard board features and other bank-specific characteristics; in Model (2) we examine the component 
diversity features and their interactions with the Hofstede dummy, while controlling for the standard board 
features and bank-specific characteristics.  
< Insert Table 6 about here > 
The results of Model (1) suggest that the overall diversity of the board reduces bank risk in 
countries that are culturally more open to diversity. Specifically, the adverse effect of board diversity on 
performance variability (SDSR) disappears in countries that are culturally open to diversity as indicated by 
the negative and significant Hofstede interaction term (HOFBOARDDIVX). This seems to be driven by the 
distinct impact foreign directors have in the two groups of countries: significantly increasing risk in 
countries less open to diversity, while having virtually no impact in countries more open to diversity, as 
suggested by the estimated coefficients of BOARDNATMIX2 and HOFBOARDNATMIX2. 
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Summarising, the results so far suggest that board size and diversity in the form of employee 
representation have a positive impact on bank performance, while board internationalisation increases bank 
risk. The proportion of employee representatives on the board plays a positive role for bank performance 
up to a threshold level, beyond which there is no incremental value added. On the other hand, diversity 
impacts risk only when minority proportions become substantial. In particular, presence of a large 
proportion of employee directors decreases risk, while a big number of foreign directors seems to have the 
opposite effect. Further, the results indicate that board diversity decreased performance variability during 
the Eurozone crisis due to the less negative effect of foreign directors during that period. On the other hand, 
board age had an increasing effect on bank risk during the Eurozone crisis. Overall, the results suggest that 
the national cultures that welcome diversity improve the impact of board diversity on bank performance. 
5.2 Robustness Tests 
We carry out additional analyses to examine the robustness of our results to alternative measures 
of bank performance and performance variability as well as to alternative estimation frameworks that treat 
the potential endogeneity issues emanating from reverse causality between board composition and bank 
performance. 
5.2.1. Alternative performance measures 
We test whether the results discussed in the previous section hold for alternative measures of bank 
performance. Specifically, we use the accounting-based return on assets (ROA) and net interest margin 
(NIM) to measure bank performance and the standard deviation of return on assets (SDROA) and the 
standard deviation of the net interest margin (SDNIM) to measure bank risk.10 Finally, we use a distance to 
default measure, the z-score (LNZSCORE), which combines performance and risk by estimating the 
number of standard deviations that a bank’s profits have to fall below its expected value before its equity 
becomes negative. The results are reported in Table 7. 
< Insert Table 7 about here > 
We find that board tenure is negatively associated with SDROA and positively associated with 
LNZSCORE. This shows that our finding of a risk-reducing effect of board tenure holds for the alternative 
risk measures. Looking at the board diversity features, we find that BOARDEMPL2 is associated positively 
with ROA and negatively with SDNIM. Overall, this confirms our finding of the performance-improving 
effect of employee representation on the board.  
5.2.2. Endogeneity  
We attempt to address possible endogeneity concerns in the estimation of the impact of board 
characteristics on bank performance by employing a two-step DPS-GMM estimation framework (Equation 
                                                 
10 We drop LLPLOAN from NIM and SDNIM regressions due to high correlation between the variables. 
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(2)). We conduct the analysis for our main performance measures (that is, SR and SDSR) and additional 
performance measures (that is, ROA, SDROA, NIM, SDNIM, and LNZSCORE).  
Table 8 reports the estimation results for SR and SDSR. Overall, we find evidence consistent with 
our main findings. In particular, the GMM results confirm the risk-reducing effect of board tenure and the 
risk-increasing effect of board age. Further, we find supportive evidence that, while the overall diversity of 
the board, captured by the diversity index, is not related to bank performance, employee representation on 
the board has a risk-reducing impact.  
< Insert Table 8 about here > 
Lastly, Table 9 reports the results of the GMM estimation for our alternative performance 
measures. Overall, the evidence confirms our findings, including the risk-reducing impact of board tenure 
(LNBOARDTEN is negatively associated with SDROA and SDNIM).  
< Insert Table 9 about here > 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we document the impact of board heterogeneity on the performance of EU listed 
banks in the years following the global financial crisis, a period of turbulence for European banks. In a 
comprehensive set-up, we consider a variety of board characteristics, including standard board features 
(type, tenure, size, and age of board members) and board diversity features (gender diversity, employee 
representation, internationalisation, and age diversity). In addition, we propose a diversity index, which 
summarises the different dimensions of diversity. In our empirical analysis, we control for unobserved 
heterogeneity and reverse causality.  
We find that board size has a positive impact on bank performance and this impact is mostly 
relevant for larger boards. This result provides support to the stream of literature that posits that larger and 
potentially more diverse boards can offer a wider range of expertise and therefore offer better advice, 
particularly for larger and more complex firms such as banks. Board tenure also has a positive impact on 
bank performance. This suggest that time on the job improves board effectiveness; and for bank boards to 
be effective at monitoring management, the tenure of board members is particularly relevant as it affects 
their level of firm-specific knowledge and expertise. This result seems to contrast with the view that boards 
with long-serving members are entrenched and therefore there should be specific term limits on directors’ 
service.  
Our findings on the role of board diversity indicate that the presence of employee representatives 
improves bank performance and reduces performance variability, while substantial presence of foreign 
directors increases bank risk. The results reveal no impact of gender diversity on bank performance. Further 
analysis uncovers a non-linear relationship between diversity and bank performance. Board diversity plays 
a bigger role in banks whose boards comprise a bigger than average proportion of minority representatives. 
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In addition, the positive impact of employee representatives is capped at a certain level of employee 
proportion.  
We also find that overall board diversity decreased performance variability during the Eurozone 
crisis, particularly due to the less detrimental impact of foreign directors which might go to suggest that 
boards with a more diverse set of skills and experiences can be more effective during times of financial 
turbulence. On the other hand, board age had a positive effect on bank risk during the crisis.   
Interestingly, our results also suggest that differences in national culture across EU countries could 
be one of the reasons behind the differential impact of board diversity on bank performance. Board diversity 
reduces risk in countries culturally more welcoming to diversity, while the opposite is true for countries 
less open to diversity. Finally, our results are consistent for a wide range of alternative proxies for bank 
performance and the treatment of endogeneity.  
Our evidence therefore supports recent policy initiatives aiming to foster board diversity. However, 
the impact of minority directors on bank performance is constrained by their representativeness on the 
board (as proportion of total board members) and influenced by the cultural norms in the country where 
the bank is headquartered. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics  
Panel A: Full sample  
No. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Performance measures 
     
SR 684 0.071 0.795 -3.750 9.443 
SDDSR 684 0.420 0.275 0.011 3.202 
ROA 672 0.004 0.013 -0.124 0.044 
SDROA 675 0.005 0.009 0.000 0.081 
NIM 678 0.021 0.023 -0.474 0.122 
SDNIM 679 0.003 0.010 0.000 0.247 
ZSCORE 670 55.543 78.224 -2.434 725.143 
      
Board structure variables 
     
DBOARDTYPE 563 0.933 0.251 0.000 1.000 
BOARDSIZE 563 16.298 5.927 6.000 34.000 
BOARDTEN 561 5.901 2.742 0.100 16.300 
BOARDAGE 563 57.463 4.439 35.800 69.500 
BOARDDIVX 563 0.467 0.173 0.100 0.875 
DBOARDWOM 563 0.821 0.384 0.000 1.000 
BOARDWOM 563 1.996 1.748 0.000 8.000 
BOARDWOM2 563 0.126 0.107 0.000 0.600 
DBOARDEMPL 563 0.302 0.460 0.000 1.000 
BOARDEMPL 563 1.474 2.762 0.000 14.000 
BOARDEMPL2 563 0.080 0.133 0.000 0.600 
DBOARDNATMIX 540 0.654 0.476 0.000 1.000 
BOARDNATMIX2 540 0.198 0.197 0.000 0.800 
CVBOARDAGE 563 0.150 0.049 0.013 0.905       
Bank-specific variables 
     
TABL 563 332.973 528.288 0.628 2,150.486 
TAGA 563 0.063 0.163 -0.272 0.889 
LOANTA 563 0.571 0.194 0.065 0.848 
TDTA 563 0.653 0.155 0.238 0.935 
ETA 563 0.065 0.033 -0.002 0.164 
LLPLOAN 552 0.011 0.011 -0.001 0.064 
CI 559 0.611 0.161 0.342 1.487 
     
Country-specific variables     
LEGAL 563 0.146 0.353 0 1 
CMC 549 1,112,874 961,050 1,870.49 3,296,011 
GDPPC 563 27,955 9,927 5,900 46,200 
HHI 563 0.074 0.042 0.0183 0.2195 
    Continued on next page 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Panel B: Test for differences in board characteristics of top and bottom performing banks  
No. of Obs. Mean No. of Obs. Mean Mean Differential 
 
Top quartile Bottom quartile 
 
Board structure variables 
     
DBOARDTYPE 140 0.950 142 0.937 0.013 
BOARDSIZE 140 15.671 142 16.275 -0.603 
BOARDTEN 140 5.756 141 5.530 0.227 
BOARDAGE 140 56.973 142 57.618 -0.645 
BOARDDIVX 140 0.486 142 0.431 0.556** 
DBOARDWOM 140 0.879 142 0.761 0.118** 
BOARDWOM 140 2.007 142 1.683 0.324* 
BOARDWOM2 140 0.130 142 0.104 0.025** 
DBOARDEMPL 140 0.300 142 0.211 0.088* 
BOARDEMPL 140 1.457 142 1.190 0.267 
BOARDEMPL2 140 0.079 142 0.059 0.020 
DBOARDNATMIX 136 0.713 136 0.581 0.132** 
BOARDNATMIX2 136 0.216 136 0.173 0.043* 
CVBOARDAGE 140 0.152 142 0.156 -0.005 
The table reports descriptive statistics for the sample. Panel A reports the summary statistics for performance 
measures used as dependent variables  (over 2007-2015) and for board structure, bank- and country-specific 
variables used as lagged explanatory variables (over 2007-2014); bank-specific characteristics are winsorised at 
99% of the bank-year distribution. Panel B reports the comparison between the board structure variables for 
banks in the top and bottom quartiles of stock return (SR) in each year of the sample. The t-test for the equality 
of means is reported in the last column. *, ** indicate significance at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 1. 
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Table 2 Board characteristics by country  
Country DBOARDTYPE BOARDSIZE BOARDTEN BOARDAGE BOARDDIVX DBOARDW OM BOARDW OM2 DBOARDEMPL BOARDEMPL2 DBOARDNATMIX BOARDNATMIX2 CVBOARDAGE HOF 
Austria 1.000 20.400 7.418 56.825 0.682 0.925 0.118 0.925 0.295 0.846 0.290 0.169 53  
(0.000) (3.507) (1.945) (2.368) (0.143) (0.267) (0.083) (0.267) (0.101) (0.366) (0.23) (0.022) 
 
Belgium 1.000 17.250 4.084 56.310 0.431 0.850 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.800 0.290 0.144 50  
(0.000) (6.315) (1.976) (3.037) (0.167) (0.366) (0.074) (0.000) (0.000) (0.410) (0.177) (0.035) 
 
Cyprus 0.842 15.211 4.463 56.263 0.397 0.789 0.100 0.158 0.029 0.474 0.121 0.155 n/a  
(0.375) (4.022) (2.539) (5.063) (0.125) (0.419) (0.091) (0.375) (0.074) (0.513) (0.151) (0.045) 
 
Czech R.  1.000 14.500 5.538 54.362 0.650 1.000 0.069 1.000 0.232 0.875 0.363 0.162 45  
(0.000) (0.756) (0.571) (1.424) (0.071) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.047) (0.354) (0.292) (0.011) 
 
Denmark 0.750 13.750 7.528 54.909 0.571 1.000 0.176 1.000 0.289 0.350 0.155 0.137 70  
(0.44) (3.802) (1.599) (1.832) (0.123) (0.000) (0.069) (0.000) (0.085) (0.489) (0.250) (0.032) 
 
France 0.850 17.825 5.345 58.432 0.541 0.825 0.192 0.875 0.145 0.650 0.113 0.146 48  
(0.362) (5.310) (1.292) (4.181) (0.168) (0.385) (0.137) (0.335) (0.088) (0.483) (0.111) (0.127) 
 
Germany 1.000 22.719 4.659 52.603 0.646 0.844 0.158 0.969 0.339 0.688 0.159 0.146 54  
(0.000) (8.368) (1.093) (2.994) (0.162) (0.369) (0.090) (0.177) (0.104) (0.471) (0.181) (0.042) 
 
Greece 1.000 15.591 7.386 59.659 0.366 0.909 0.084 0.000 0.000 0.364 0.068 0.168 36  
(0.000) (2.423) (2.021) (4.137) (0.106) (0.294) (0.039) (0.000) (0.000) (0.492) (0.125) (0.047) 
 
Hungary 1.000 10.250 11.288 61.325 0.128 0.125 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.100 42  
(0.000) (1.035) (1.391) (1.524) (0.041) (0.354) (0.032) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) 
 
Ireland 1.000 12.375 3.231 57.713 0.420 0.875 0.106 0.000 0.000 0.938 0.238 0.137 55  
(0.000) (2.473) (1.198) (1.485) (0.080) (0.342) (0.057) (0.000) (0.000) (0.250) (0.102) (0.023) 
 
Italy 0.979 18.990 5.179 61.308 0.333 0.639 0.070 0.000 0.000 0.356 0.070 0.160 45  
(0.143) (7.051) (2.542) (3.755) (0.111) (0.483) (0.081) (0.000) (0.000) (0.481) (0.108) (0.031) 
 
Lithuania 1.000 14.667 5.200 52.033 0.408 1.000 0.227 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.153 55  
(0.000) (0.577) (0.700) (1.528) (0.029) (0.000) (0.035) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.023) 
 
Malta 0.000 9.000 7.533 51.900 0.200 0.333 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.083 45  
(0.000) (0.000) (1.401) (1.418) (0.100) (0.577) (0.064) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.096) 
 
Netherlands 1.000 7.875 4.650 53.925 0.350 0.125 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.125 0.025 0.209 68  
(0.000) (0.641) (1.702) (2.836) (0.093) (0.354) (0.079) (0.000) (0.000) (0.354) (0.071) (0.027) 
 
Poland 1.000 16.786 4.919 52.214 0.468 0.810 0.107 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.374 0.156 34  
(0.000) (1.718) (1.862) (4.39) (0.132) (0.397) (0.080) (0.000) (0.000) (0.477) (0.279) (0.024) 
 
Portugal 0.967 19.767 7.227 57.707 0.377 0.633 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.767 0.210 0.157 33  
(0.183) (6.986) (4.085) (2.096) (0.107) (0.490) (0.030) (0.000) (0.000) (0.430) (0.130) (0.028) 
 
Romania 1.000 9.857 6.229 59.800 0.389 0.857 0.087 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.400 0.109 30  
(0.000) (0.378) (0.757) (1.143) (0.056) (0.378) (0.039) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.129) (0.010) 
 
Spain 1.000 14.159 8.375 60.995 0.387 0.955 0.128 0.000 0.000 0.750 0.134 0.139 43  
(0.000) (3.206) (3.773) (3.907) (0.101) (0.211) (0.063) (0.000) (0.000) (0.438) (0.094) (0.035) 
 
Sweden 0.625 11.225 6.333 54.687 0.640 1.000 0.316 0.600 0.125 0.974 0.316 0.137 73  
(0.490) (2.224) (2.021) (3.191) (0.108) (0.000) (0.122) (0.496) (0.113) (0.162) (0.155) (0.040) 
 
UK 1.000 13.308 4.560 58.463 0.473 0.962 0.151 0.000 0.000 0.942 0.338 0.139 62  
(0.000) (3.467) (2.262) (1.627) (0.089) (0.194) (0.076) (0.000) (0.000) (0.235) (0.136) (0.045) 
 
The table reports the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) of board variables for each country in the sample over the period 2007-2014. Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 1. 
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Table 3 Do board characteristics  impact on bank performance? 
 
SR SDSR 
 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
         
DBOARDTYPE 0.0305 0.0342 0.0086 0.1065 -0.0207 -0.0205 0.0862** -0.0253 
 
(0.29) (0.34) (0.13) (0.83) (-0.47) (-0.47) (2.46) (-0.54) 
LNBOARDSIZE 0.2419** 0.2217* 0.1147 0.2168* 0.0049 0.0041 0.0040 0.0149 
 
(2.07) (1.96) (1.15) (1.94) (0.13) (0.10) (0.11) (0.41) 
LNBOARDTEN 0.0400 0.0339 0.0822 0.0828 -0.0608 -0.0611 -0.1153*** -0.0622 
 
(0.48) (0.39) (1.07) (1.03) (-1.32) (-1.32) (-2.77) (-1.29) 
LNBOARDAGE -1.2096 -1.1608 -0.1510 -1.7947** 0.0620 0.0639 0.0053 0.0733 
 
(-1.61) (-1.52) (-0.30) (-2.00) (0.32) (0.33) (0.03) (0.31) 
BOARDDIVX 
 
0.3157 0.2733 
  
0.0128 0.0056 
 
  
(0.98) (0.65) 
  
(0.18) (0.07) 
 
BOARDWOM2 
   
-0.2916 
   
0.0283 
    
(-0.88) 
   
(0.24) 
BOARDEMPL2 
   
1.0712 
   
-0.3483** 
    
(1.51) 
   
(-2.33) 
BOARDNATMIX2 
   
0.4276 
   
0.1285**     
(1.29) 
   
(2.24) 
CVBOARDAGE 
   
-0.4623 
   
-0.1159     
(-1.06) 
   
(-0.59) 
Bank-specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-specific controls No No Yes No No No Yes No 
Country fixed effects  Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered SE (bank) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 546 546 513 524 546 546 513 524 
Adjusted R-squared 0.271 0.272 0.260 0.303 0.550 0.549 0.505 0.556 
The table reports the main regression results of the effects of board features on bank performance  and its variability measured by 
stock return (SR) and standard deviation of stock return (SDSR). Model (1) presents the results for the effects of banks’ sta ndard 
board features on their performance; Model (2) adds the board diversity index; Model (3) adds country-specific variables; Model 
(4) replaces the diversity index in Model (2) with the component diversity features. The models control for bank-specific 
characteristics, country fixed effects (except Model (3)) and time fixed effects. Bank-specific characteristics are winsorised at 
99% of the bank-year distribution. All independent variables are lagged by one period. The t-statistics calculated using standard 
errors clustered at the bank level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, an d 1% levels, 
respectively. Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 1. 
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Table 4 Performance effects of board characteristics: Non-linearity 
 
SR SDSR 
 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)        
DBOARDTYPE -0.0214 0.0366 0.1012 -0.0134 -0.0150 -0.0245  
(-0.19) (0.37) (0.80) (-0.30) (-0.35) (-0.51) 
LNBOARDSIZE 
 
0.2214* 0.1879* 
 
0.0033 0.0119   
(1.95) (1.69) 
 
(0.09) (0.32) 
LNBOARDTEN 
 
0.0333 0.0736 
 
-0.0625 -0.0635   
(0.39) (0.87) 
 
(-1.35) (-1.27) 
LNBOARDAGE 
 
-1.1511 -1.8142* 
 
0.0868 0.0854   
(-1.48) (-1.87) 
 
(0.46) (0.33) 
LNBOARDSIZEUP 0.2986* 
  
0.0126 
  
 
(1.71) 
  
(0.25) 
  
LNBOARDSIZEDN 0.3113 
  
0.0161 
  
 
(1.52) 
  
(0.29) 
  
LNBOARDTENUP -0.0225 
  
-0.0579 
  
 
(-0.21) 
  
(-1.08) 
  
LNBOARDTENDN -0.1135 
  
-0.0566 
  
 
(-0.74) 
  
(-0.87) 
  
LNBOARDAGEUP -0.9929 
  
0.2763 
  
 
(-1.06) 
  
(1.36) 
  
LNBOARDAGEDN -0.9774 
  
0.2900 
  
 
(-1.03) 
  
(1.41) 
  
BOARDDIVXUP 
 
0.3401 
  
0.0705 
 
  
(0.96) 
  
(0.86) 
 
BOARDDIVXDN 
 
0.3783 
  
0.1606 
 
  
(0.77) 
  
(1.12) 
 
BOARDWOM2UP 
  
-0.1788 
  
0.0316    
(-0.51) 
  
(0.27) 
BOARDWOM2DN 
  
0.7876 
  
0.1667    
(0.79) 
  
(0.60) 
BOARDEMPL2UP 
  
1.0127 
  
-0.3547**    
(1.46) 
  
(-2.37) 
BOARDEMPL2DN 
  
6.9161** 
  
-0.0997    
(2.15) 
  
(-0.17) 
BOARDNATMIX2UP 
  
0.4285 
  
0.1263**    
(1.38) 
  
(2.18) 
BOARDNATMIX2DN 
  
0.4350 
  
0.1974    
(0.97) 
  
(1.26) 
CVBOARDAGEUP 
  
-0.6527 
  
-0.0798    
(-1.10) 
  
(-0.32) 
CVBOARDAGEDN 
  
-0.8443 
  
0.0018    
(-0.79) 
  
(0.00) 
Bank-specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered SE (bank) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 546 546 524 546 546 524 
Adjusted R-squared 0.272 0.270 0.300 0.552 0.550 0.553 
26 
The table reports the results of the effects of board features on bank performance and its variability measured by 
stock return (SR) and standard deviation of stock return (SDSR) with the use of thresholds for the board variables, 
where suffixes UP and DN indicate a board variable value above and below its  threshold level, respectively. Model 
(1) presents the results for the effects of banks’ standard board features on their performance; Model (2) adds the 
board diversity index; Model (3) replaces the diversity index with the component diversity features. All the models 
control for bank-specific characteristics, country and time fixed effects. Bank-specific characteristics are 
winsorised at 99% of the bank-year distribution. All independent variables are lagged by one period. The t-statistics 
calculated using standard errors clustered at the bank level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Definitions of the variables are provided in Append ix 1. 
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Table 5 Performance effects of board characteristics: Eurozone crisis  
 
SR SDSR 
 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)        
DBOARDTYPE -0.0507 0.0399 0.1302 0.0224 -0.0197 -0.0174  
(-0.61) (0.38) (0.88) (0.37) (-0.45) (-0.37) 
ECDBOARDTYPE 0.0926 
  
-0.0738 
  
 
(0.68) 
  
(-0.91) 
  
LNBOARDSIZE 0.3126 0.1746 0.1946* -0.0279 -0.0031 0.0026  
(1.44) (1.62) (1.71) (-0.53) (-0.08) (0.07) 
ECLNBOARDSIZE -0.0992 
  
0.0539 
  
 
(-0.41) 
  
(0.97) 
  
LNBOARDTEN 0.2020* 0.0210 0.0677 -0.0562 -0.0630 -0.0713  
(1.87) (0.23) (0.76) (-1.18) (-1.38) (-1.53) 
ECLNBOARDTEN -0.2242 
  
-0.0053 
  
 
(-1.17) 
  
(-0.10) 
  
LNBOARDAGE -2.1569** -1.1772 -2.0090** -0.2420 0.0614 0.1160  
(-2.54) (-1.56) (-2.17) (-0.88) (0.32) (0.51) 
ECLNBOARDAGE 1.3091 
  
0.4665** 
  
 
(1.25) 
  
(2.04) 
  
BOARDDIVX 
 
1.1534 
  
0.1406 
 
  
(1.11) 
  
(1.28) 
 
ECBOARDDIVX 
 
-1.2532 
  
-0.1912* 
 
  
(-1.08) 
  
(-1.74) 
 
BOARDWOM2 
  
-1.1610 
  
0.1403    
(-1.53) 
  
(0.86) 
ECBOARDWOM2 
  
1.1788 
  
-0.1976    
(1.38) 
  
(-1.30) 
BOARDEMPL2 
  
2.3239 
  
-0.2669    
(1.59) 
  
(-1.35) 
ECBOARDEMPL2 
  
-1.7080 
  
-0.1643    
(-1.42) 
  
(-1.15) 
BOARDNATMIX2 
  
1.3336 
  
0.2616***    
(1.36) 
  
(3.22) 
ECBOARDNATMIX2 
  
-1.2839 
  
-0.1970**    
(-1.32) 
  
(-2.10) 
CVBOARDAGE 
  
1.8911 
  
-0.6374    
(0.80) 
  
(-1.23) 
ECCVBOARDAGE 
  
-2.9492 
  
0.6902    
(-1.08) 
  
(1.34) 
Bank-specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered SE (bank) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 546 546 524 546 546 524 
Adjusted R-squared 0.270 0.287 0.344 0.553 0.552 0.566 
28 
The table reports the results of the impact of the Eurozone crisis on the association between board 
features and bank performance and its variability measured by stock return (SR) and standard 
deviation of stock return (SDSR). Model (1) includes standard board features and their interactions 
with the Eurozone crisis dummy (the latter is equal to 1 for years 2010-2014 and zero for years 
2007-2009); Model (2) includes the board diversity index and its interaction with the Eurozone crisis 
dummy; Model (3) replaces the diversity index and its interaction with the Eurozone crisis dummy  
with the component diversity features and their interactions with the Eurozone crisis dummy. All 
models control for bank-specific characteristics, country and time fixed effects. Bank-specific 
characteristics are winsorised at 99% of the bank-year distribution. All independent variables are 
lagged by one period. The t-statistics calculated using standard errors clustered at the bank level are 
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 1. 
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Table 6 Performance effects of board characteristics:  Cultural openness to diversity 
 
SR SDSR 
 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2) 
     
DBOARDTYPE -0.0747 0.0383 0.0022 0.0154  
(-1.29) (0.26) (0.06) (0.41) 
LNBOARDSIZE 0.1889* 0.1345 0.0065 0.0149  
(1.76) (1.14) (0.17) (0.35) 
LNBOARDTEN 0.0993 0.1553** -0.0820* -0.0816*  
(1.35) (2.14) (-1.72) (-1.67) 
LNBOARDAGE -0.7083 -1.1397** -0.0071 -0.0418  
(-1.55) (-2.60) (-0.04) (-0.18) 
BOARDDIVX 0.1681 
 
0.1745** 
 
 
(0.70) 
 
(2.28) 
 
HOFBOARDDIVX 0.2270 
 
-0.2979* 
 
 
(0.39) 
 
(-1.81) 
 
BOARDWOM2 
 
0.3971 
 
-0.0040   
(1.03) 
 
(-0.03) 
HOFBOARDWOM2 
 
-1.0785* 
 
0.0346   
(-1.71) 
 
(0.15) 
BOARDEMPL2 
 
-0.6898 
 
-0.2470   
(-0.62) 
 
(-1.00) 
HOFBOARDEMPL2 
 
2.1634 
 
-0.0394   
(1.21) 
 
(-0.12) 
BOARDNATMIX2 
 
0.0680 
 
0.2705***   
(0.32) 
 
(3.07) 
HOFBOARDNATMIX2 
 
0.6148 
 
-0.2760*   
(1.10) 
 
(-1.96) 
CVBOARDAGE 
 
-0.4643 
 
-0.0047   
(-1.22) 
 
(-0.03) 
HOFCVBOARDAGE 
 
1.6287 
 
-0.5432   
(1.10) 
 
(-0.90) 
Bank-specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered SE (bank) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 527 505 527 505 
Adjusted R-squared 0.273 0.312 0.559 0.566 
The table reports the results of the impact of the countries’ openness to diversity on the association between 
board diversity features and bank performance and its variability measured by stock return (SR) and standard 
deviation of stock return (SDSR). Model (1) includes the diversity index and its interaction with the Hofstede 
dummy (the latter is equal to 1 for countries more open to diversity and zero otherwise); Model (2) replaces the 
diversity index and its interaction with the Hofstede dummy with the component diversity features and their 
interactions with the Hofstede dummy. All models control for bank-specific characteristics, country and time 
fixed effects. Bank-specific characteristics are winsorised at 99% of the bank-year distribution. All independent 
variables are lagged by one period. The t-statistics calculated using standard errors clustered at the bank level are 
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Definitions 
of the variables are provided in Appendix 1. 
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Table 7 Performance effects of board characteristics: Alternative performance measures  
 
ROA SDROA NIM SDNIM LNZSCORE 
 
Model 
(1) 
Model 
(2) 
Model 
(3) 
Model 
(1) 
Model 
(2) 
Model 
(3) 
Model 
(1) 
Model 
(2) 
Model 
(3) 
Model 
(1) 
Model 
(2) 
Model 
(3) 
Model 
(1) 
Model 
(2) 
Model 
(3)                 
DBOARDTYPE -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0007 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0017 0.0009 0.0010 -0.0006 0.0007 0.0007 0.0000 0.0455 0.0439 0.1163  
(-0.23) (-0.20) (0.65) (-0.94) (-0.94) (-1.05) (0.54) (0.56) (-0.40) (1.15) (1.15) (0.07) (0.16) (0.15) (0.36) 
LNBOARDSIZE -0.0026 -0.0028 -0.0024 0.0025 0.0026 0.0028 -0.0029 -0.0032 -0.0037 0.0017 0.0016 0.0015 -0.1897 -0.1741 -0.2018  
(-1.00) (-1.05) (-0.84) (0.99) (1.00) (0.97) (-0.98) (-1.07) (-1.22) (1.09) (1.04) (0.92) (-0.65) (-0.59) (-0.68) 
LNBOARDTEN 0.0010 0.0009 0.0015 -0.0036* -0.0036* -0.0039* -0.0048 -0.0049 -0.0057 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0007 0.3141 0.3157 0.4344**  
(0.38) (0.36) (0.50) (-1.86) (-1.85) (-1.91) (-1.37) (-1.41) (-1.60) (-0.46) (-0.47) (-0.53) (1.66) (1.66) (2.19) 
LNBOARDAGE -0.0086 -0.0079 -0.0141 0.0077 0.0074 0.0110 0.0229 0.0237 0.0343* 0.0013 0.0014 0.0034 -0.2122 -0.2375 -1.6007  
(-0.66) (-0.60) (-0.90) (0.96) (0.91) (1.10) (1.54) (1.55) (1.84) (0.25) (0.28) (0.60) (-0.21) (-0.23) (-1.39) 
BOARDDIVX 
 
0.0050 
  
-0.0025 
  
0.0049 
  
0.0010 
  
-0.2475 
 
  
(0.85) 
  
(-0.55) 
  
(0.72) 
  
(0.65) 
  
(-0.48) 
 
BOARDWOM2 
  
0.0000 
  
-0.0016 
  
0.0066 
  
0.0016 
  
-0.4346    
(0.00) 
  
(-0.24) 
  
(0.92) 
  
(0.94) 
  
(-0.48) 
BOARDEMPL2 
  
0.0123* 
  
-0.0092 
  
-0.0072 
  
-0.0034* 
  
1.3668    
(1.76) 
  
(-1.53) 
  
(-0.75) 
  
(-1.70) 
  
(1.30) 
BOARDNATMIX2 
  
0.0014 
  
0.0007 
  
-0.0026 
  
-0.0000 
  
0.1291    
(0.50) 
  
(0.31) 
  
(-0.59) 
  
(-0.03) 
  
(0.34) 
CVBOARDAGE 
  
-0.0042 
  
0.0039 
  
0.0203 
  
0.0048 
  
-1.4093    
(-0.35) 
  
(0.39) 
  
(1.42) 
  
(1.26) 
  
(-1.23) 
Bank-specific 
controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered SE 
(bank) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 538 538 516 543 543 521 543 543 521 545 545 523 525 525 503 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.332 0.332 0.318 0.468 0.468 0.468 0.525 0.525 0.524 0.0789 0.0774 0.0723 0.400 0.400 0.395 
31 
The table reports the results of the effects of board features on bank performance using alternative performance measures including return on assets (ROA), standard deviation of the return 
on assets (SDROA), net interest margin (NIM), standard deviation of the net interest margin (SDNIM), and z-score (LNZSCORE). Model (1) presents the results for the effects of banks’ 
standard board features on their performance; Model (2) adds the board diversity index; Model (3) replaces the diversity index with the compon ent diversity features. All the models control 
for bank-specific characteristics, country and time fixed effects. Bank-specific characteristics are winsorised at 99% of the bank-year distribution. All independent variables are lagged by one 
period. The t-statistics calculated using standard errors clustered at the bank level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 1. 
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Table 8 Two-step DPS-GMM: Do board characteristics impact on bank performance?  
  SR SDSR 
 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
  
      
DBOARDTYPE -0.0434 0.0833 0.2062 0.0186 0.0301 -0.0342  
(-0.08) (0.23) (0.46) (0.84) (0.41) (-0.36) 
LNBOARDSIZE -0.1295 -0.0728 -0.2211 -0.0556 -0.0120 -0.0570  
(-0.41) (-0.28) (-0.71) (-1.63) (-0.19) (-0.63) 
LNBOARDTEN -0.2216 -0.0578 0.0518 -0.1101*** -0.1087* -0.0541  
(-1.32) (-0.28) (0.25) (-3.96) (-1.68) (-0.88) 
LNBOARDAGE 1.3934 0.3421 0.5788 0.3253*** 0.3009 0.1796  
(1.22) (0.31) (0.37) (2.90) (1.03) (0.56) 
BOARDDIVX 
 
0.2012 
  
-0.0724 
 
  
(0.34) 
  
(-0.61) 
 
BOARDWOM2 
  
-0.0331 
  
0.0907    
(-0.04) 
  
(0.32) 
BOARDEMPL2 
  
0.4384 
  
-0.5551** 
   
(0.54) 
  
(-2.42) 
BOARDNATMIX2 
  
0.2103 
  
0.0228 
   
(0.44) 
  
(0.18) 
CVBOARDAGE 
  
0.1208 
  
-0.0276 
   
(0.07) 
  
(-0.08) 
Bank-specific 
controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 546 546 524 546 546 524 
Hansen (df) 53.99 57.84 53.04 64.93 64.14 58.14  
(274) (294) (333) (274) (294) (333) 
AR(1) -1.795* -2.060** -3.221*** -1.928* -1.887* -1.843* 
AR(2) -1.345 -1.323 -1.767* -2.293** -2.184** -1.905* 
The table reports the results of the two-step Dynamic Panel System GMM regressions of performance and its 
variability measured by stock return (SR) and standard deviation of stock return (SDSR) on standard and 
diversity board features, bank-specific control variables and year fixed effects. Model (1) presents the results 
for the effects of banks’ standard board features; Model (2) adds the board diversity index; Model (3) replaces 
the board diversity index with the component diversity features. Bank-specific characteristics are winsorised 
at 99% of the bank-year distribution. All independent variables are treated as endogenous. Endogenous  
variables are instrumented by one of their past values. The t -statistics calculated using Windmeijer’s robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. The null hypothesis for the Hansen test of overidentification is 
that all instruments are exogenous. AR(1) and AR(2) are test statistics for the null hypothesis that there is no 
serial correlation of order 1 and 2 in the first-difference residuals. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 1. 
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Table 9 Two-step DPS-GMM: Alternative performance measures 
 
ROA SDROA NIM SDNIM LNZSCORE 
 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (1) Model 
(2) 
Model 
(3) 
Model 
(1) 
Model 
(2) 
Model 
(3) 
Model (1) Model 
(2) 
Model 
(3) 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
                
DBOARDTYPE 0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0066 -0.0020 -0.0021 -0.0060 0.0014 0.0051 0.0013 0.0011 0.0013 0.0014 -0.6626 -0.5826 0.4754 
 
(0.11) (-0.10) (-0.80) (-0.43) (-0.41) (-1.29) (0.33) (1.28) (0.29) (1.34) (1.02) (0.80) (-0.95) (-0.94) (0.73) 
LNBOARDSIZE -0.0036 -0.0034 -0.0043 0.0000 0.0003 0.0035 -0.0015 -0.0037 -0.0011 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0013 -0.0857 0.0671 -0.2975 
 
(-1.23) (-0.88) (-0.91) (0.02) (0.10) (0.85) (-0.38) (-0.99) (-0.31) (-0.91) (-0.47) (-1.05) (-0.16) (0.09) (-0.58) 
LNBOARDTEN 0.0036 0.0022 0.0009 -0.0058** -0.0051* -0.0053* -0.0027 0.0009 0.0002 -0.0017*** -0.0013 -0.0017* 0.3023 0.4662 0.4446 
 
(1.44) (0.56) (0.25) (-2.36) (-1.87) (-1.93) (-0.85) (0.27) (0.05) (-3.75) (-1.51) (-1.94) (0.89) (1.09) (0.90) 
LNBOARDAGE 0.0021 -0.0006 0.0076 0.0200 0.0200 0.0174 0.0211 0.0148 0.0063 0.0028 0.0023 0.0031 0.1308 0.4407 1.5693 
 
(0.19) (-0.04) (0.37) (1.50) (1.12) (1.54) (0.99) (0.62) (0.24) (0.86) (0.51) (0.75) (0.06) (0.19) (0.54) 
BOARDDIVX 
 
0.0062 
  
-0.0008 
  
-0.0012 
  
0.0015 
  
0.2197 
 
  
(0.76) 
  
(-0.15) 
  
(-0.15) 
  
(0.79) 
  
(0.24) 
 
BOARDWOM2 
  
-0.0108 
  
0.0013 
  
-0.0055 
  
0.0010 
  
0.7090 
   
(-0.86) 
  
(0.18) 
  
(-0.46) 
  
(0.31) 
  
(0.39) 
BOARDEMPL2 
  
0.0115 
  
-0.0085 
  
0.0092 
  
-0.0011 
  
2.8994 
   
(0.90) 
  
(-0.78) 
  
(0.83) 
  
(-0.39) 
  
(1.38) 
BOARDNATMIX
2 
  
-0.0030 
  
0.0007 
  
-0.0030 
  
0.0002 
  
0.0390 
   
(-0.51) 
  
(0.26) 
  
(-0.49) 
  
(0.14) 
  
(0.04) 
CVBOARDAGE 
  
0.0032 
  
0.0209 
  
-0.0017 
  
0.0015 
  
0.1858    
(0.19) 
  
(0.87) 
  
(-0.07) 
  
(0.54) 
  
(0.08) 
Bank-specific 
controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 543 543 521 544 544 522 546 546 524 546 546 524 531 531 509 
Hansen (df) 44.56 54.12 58.53 57.89 57.90 47.53 60.37 55.65 53.87 52.32 54.32 45.03 61.34 64.54 58.71 
 
(274) (294) (332) (274) (294) (332) (222) (294) (333) (274) (294) (333) (274) (293) (326) 
AR(1) -2.563** -2.580*** -2.635*** -1.681* -1.657* -1.451 -1.829* -1.869* -1.682* -1.460 -1.542 -1.324 -3.033*** -2.793*** -2.615*** 
AR(2) -0.122 0.110 -0.0724 1.624 1.599 1.554 -0.416 -0.299 -0.149 -1.932* -1.802* -1.946* -1.558 -1.340 -1.631 
34 
The table reports the results of the two-step Dynamic Panel System GMM regressions of alternative performance measures (return on assets (ROA), standard deviation of the return on assets (SDROA), net interest 
margin (NIM), standard deviation of the net interest margin (SDNIM), and z-score (LNZSCORE)) on standard and diversity board features, bank-specific control variables and year fixed effects. Model (1) presents 
the results for the effects of banks’ standard board features; Model (2) adds the board diversity index; Model (3) replaces the board diversity index with the component diversity features. Bank-specific characteristics  
are winsorised at 99% of the bank-year distribution. All independent variables are treated as endogenous. Endogenous variables are instrumented by one of their past values. The t-statistics calculated using Windmeijer’s  
robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The null hypothesis for the Hansen test of overidentification is that all instruments are exogenous. AR(1) and AR(2) are test statistics for the null hypothesis that there 
is no serial correlation of order 1 and 2 in the first-difference residuals. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 1. 
 
35 
 
Appendix 1 Variable definitions  
Variable Definition Source 
Performance Variables 
SR Daily stock return (annual average) Datastream (now Thomson Eikon) 
SDDSR Standard deviation of SR (t, t-1, t-2) Authors' calculation using Datastream (now 
Thomson Eikon) 
ROA Return on Assets (annual dataO Bankscope data (now Orbis Bank Focus) 
SDROA Standard deviation of ROA (t, t-1, t-2) Authors' calculation using Bankscope data 
(now Orbis Bank Focus) 
NIM Net interest margin (annual data) Bankscope (now Orbis Bank Focus) 
SDNIM Standard deviation of NIM (t, t-1, t-2) Authors' calculation using Bankscope data 
(now Orbis Bank Focus) 
ZSCORE (3-year average return on assets + 3-year average equity 
capital ratio)/3-year standard deviation of return on assets 
Authors' calculation using Bankscope data 
(now Orbis Bank Focus) 
LNZSCORE Ln(ZSCORE) Authors' calculation using Bankscope data 
(now Orbis Bank Focus) 
Board variables – Standard 
DBOARDTYPE Dummy equal to 0 if board is one tier and 1 if two tier BoardEx 
BOARDSIZE Board size = Number of board members BoardEx 
LNBOARDSIZE Ln(BOARDSIZE) Authors' calculation using BoardEx data 
BOARDTEN Board tenure (years) BoardEx 
LNBOARDTEN Ln(BOARDTEN) Authors' calculation using BoardEx data 
BOARDAGE Board age = Average age of board members (years) BoardEx 
LNBOARDAGE Ln(BOARDAGE) Authors' calculation using BoardEx data 
Board variables – Diversity 
BOARDDIVX Diversity index = (1) The board diversity variables  
(BOARDWOM2, BOARDEMPL2, BOARDNATMIX2, and 
CVBOARDAGE) are converted into discrete variables  
ranging from 1 to 10 based on the decile of the sample 
distribution they fall into (with 1 being the bottom and 10 
the top decile); (2) the diversity index for each bank-year 
is computed as BOARDDIVX it =
1
40
∑ Dit
j4
j=1 . The index 
ranges from 0 (low diversity) to 1 (high diversity). 
Authors' calculation using BoardEx data 
DBOARDWOM Dummy equal to 1 if both genders are represented on the 
board and 0 if the board is formed exclusively by men 
Authors' calculation using BoardEx data 
BOARDWOM Number of women on the board BoardEx 
BOARDWOM2 Fraction of women on the board Authors' calculation using BoardEx data 
DBOARDEMPL Dummy equal to 1 if employees are present on the board 
and 0 otherwise 
Authors' calculation using BoardEx data 
BOARDEMPL Number of employees on the board BoardEx 
BOARDEMPL2 Fraction of employees on the board Authors' calculation using BoardEx data 
DBOARDNATMIX Dummy equal to 1 if percentage of foreign members on 
the board greater than 0 and 0 if the board is formed 
exclusively by domestic members 
Authors' calculation using BoardEx data 
BOARDNATMIX2 Nationality mix = Percentage of foreign members on the 
board 
BoardEx 
CVBOARDAGE Coefficient of variation of board members' age = Standard 
deviation of board age/BOARDAGE 
Authors' calculation using BoardEx data 
Bank-specific variables 
TABL Total assets (Euro billions) 
 
LNTA Ln(TABL) Authors' calculation using Bankscope data 
(now Orbis Bank Focus) 
TAGA Total asset growth Authors' calculation using Bankscope data 
(now Orbis Bank Focus) 
LOANTA Loan ratio = Gross loans to total assets Authors' calculation using Bankscope data 
(now Orbis Bank Focus) 
TDTA Deposit ratio = Deposit and short-term funding to total 
assets 
Authors' calculation using Bankscope data 
(now Orbis Bank Focus) 
ETA Equity to total assets Bankscope (now Orbis Bank Focus) 
LLPLOAN Quality of loan portfolio = Loan loss provisions to gross 
loans 
Authors' calculation using Bankscope data 
(now Orbis Bank Focus) 
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CI Cost to income ratio (%) Bankscope (now Orbis Bank Focus) 
Country-specific variables 
LEGAL Dummy equal to 1 if country has a common law legal 
system and 0 otherwise 
Authors' calculation using data from CIA, 
Commonwealth network, NYU Law Global 
and Hatzimihail (2013) 
GDPC GDP in Euro per capita Authors' calculation using Eurostat data 
LNGDPC Ln(GDPC) Authors' calculation using Eurostat data 
HHI Banking sector concentration = Herfindahl Hirschman 
index (%) 
ECB statistical data warehouse 
CMC Country market capitalisation (Euro millions) Authors' calculation using World Federation 
of Exchanges (WFE) and ECB data 
LNCMC Ln(CMC) Authors' calculation using World Federation 
of Exchanges (WFE) and ECB data 
EUROCRISIS Eurozone crisis dummy equal to 1 for years 2010-2014 and 
0 otherwise 
Authors' calculation 
HOF Hofstede index = The average value across the six 
Hofstede dimensions of national culture (i.e., (100 - power 
distance), individualism, (100 - masculinity), (100 - 
uncertainty avoidance), long-term orientation, and 
indulgence) 
Authors' calculation using the Hofstede 
Insight data 
DHOF Hofstede dummy equal to 1 if HOF is above the sample 
mean (greater national openness to diversity) and 0 
otherwise (lower national openness to diversity) 
Authors' calculation 
Thresholds 
LNBOARDSIZEUP LNBOARDSIZE above its threshold level Authors' calculation 
LNBOARDSIZEDN LNBOARDSIZE below its threshold level Authors' calculation 
LNBOARDTENUP LNBOARDTEN above its threshold level Authors' calculation 
LNBOARDTENDN LNBOARDTEN below its threshold level Authors' calculation 
LNBOARDAGEUP LNBOARDAGE above its threshold level Authors' calculation 
LNBOARDAGEDN LNBOARDAGE below its threshold level Authors' calculation 
BOARDDIVXUP BOARDDIVX above its threshold level Authors' calculation 
BOARDDIVXDN BOARDDIVX  below its threshold level Authors' calculation 
BOARDWOM2UP BOARDWOM2 above its threshold level Authors' calculation 
BOARDWOM2DN BOARDWOM2 below its threshold level Authors' calculation 
BOARDEMPL2UP BOARDEMPL2 above its threshold level Authors' calculation 
BOARDEMPL2DN BOARDEMPL2 below its threshold level Authors' calculation 
BOARDNATMIX2UP BOARDNATMIX2 above its threshold level Authors' calculation 
BOARDNATMIX2DN BOARDNATMIX2 below its threshold level Authors' calculation 
Interactions 
ECDBOARDTYPE EUROCRISIS * DBOARDTYPE Authors' calculation 
ECLNBOARDSIZE EUROCRISIS * LNBOARDSIZE Authors' calculation 
ECLNBOARDTEN EUROCRISIS * LNBOARDTEN Authors' calculation 
ECLNBOARDAGE EUROCRISIS * LNBOARDAGE Authors' calculation 
ECBOARDDIVX EUROCRISIS * BOARDDIVX Authors' calculation 
ECBOARDWOM2 EUROCRISIS * BOARDWOM2 Authors' calculation 
ECBOARDEMPL2 EUROCRISIS * BOARDEMPL2 Authors' calculation 
ECBOARDNATMIX2 EUROCRISIS * BOARDNATMIX2 Authors' calculation 
ECCVBOARDAGE EUROCRISIS * CVBOARDAGE Authors' calculation 
HOFBOARDDIVX DHOF * BOARDDIVX Authors' calculation 
HOFBOARDWOM2 DHOF * BOARDWOM2 Authors' calculation 
HOFBOARDEMPL2 DHOF * BOARDEMPL2 Authors' calculation 
HOFBOARDNATMIX2 DHOF * BOARDNATMIX2 Authors' calculation 
HOFCVBOARDAGE DHOF * CVBOARDAGE Authors' calculation 
The table defines the variables used in the study and the source of the data. 
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Appendix 2 Correlation matrix  
 
DBOARD
TYPE 
LNBOAR
DSIZE 
LNBOAR
DTEN 
LNBOAR
DAGE 
BOARDD
IVX 
BOARDW
OM2 
BOARDE
MPL2 
BOARDN
ATMIX2 
CVBOAR
DAGE 
LNTA TAGA LOANTA TDTA ETA LLPLOA
N 
CI 
DBOARDTYPE 1 
               
                 
LNBOARDSIZE 0.2271* 1 
              
 
0 
               
LNBOARDTEN 0.0288 0.0751* 1 
             
 
0.4963 0.0757 
              
LNBOARDAGE 0.1486* 0.2173* 0.3560* 1 
            
 
0.0004 0 0 
             
BOARDDIVX -0.1168* 0.1566* 0.0472 -0.2689* 1 
           
 
0.0055 0.0002 0.2648 0 
            
BOARDWOM2 -0.2915* -0.0757* 0.0188 -0.1338* 0.6161* 1 
          
 
0 0.0727 0.6572 0.0015 0 
           
BOARDEMPL2 -0.1985* 0.2020* 0.1323* -0.2337* 0.6568* 0.3225* 1 
         
 
0 0 0.0017 0 0 0 
          
BOARDNATMIX2 -0.0021 0.0740* -0.0836* -0.1164* 0.5356* 0.2001* 0.0729* 1 
        
 
0.9614 0.0856 0.0527 0.0068 0 0 0.0907 
         
CVBOARDAGE 0.0093 0.0061 -0.0074 -0.2720* 0.2513* -0.1043* 0.0188 -0.0583 1 
       
 
0.826 0.8855 0.8615 0 0 0.0132 0.6569 0.1761 
        
LNTA -0.0255 0.3924* -0.0946* 0.2520* 0.1490* 0.3011* 0.0626 0.1437* -0.2491* 1 
      
 
0.5452 0 0.025 0 0.0004 0 0.1378 0.0008 0 
       
TAGA -0.0029 -0.1460* 0.0279 -0.1112* -0.0528 -0.0585 -0.0755* -0.0173 0.0536 -0.2012* 1 
     
 
0.9452 0.0005 0.5092 0.0083 0.2113 0.1659 0.0735 0.689 0.2043 0 
      
LOANTA 0.0146 0.1443* 0.1615* 0.2341* -0.1955* -0.1712* -0.2125* -0.0977* 0.0911* -0.1609* -0.043 1 
    
 
0.7293 0.0006 0.0001 0 0 0 0 0.0232 0.0307 0.0001 0.3082 
     
TDTA 0.0601 -0.1578* 0.1052* -0.1798* -0.1565* -0.3079* -0.0159 -0.1365* 0.1297* -0.5979* 0.0465 0.3350* 1 
   
 
0.1544 0.0002 0.0127 0 0.0002 0 0.7059 0.0015 0.002 0 0.2705 0 
    
ETA 0.0268 -0.1149* 0.0283 -0.0312 -0.1224* -0.2073* -0.1527* 0.1110* 0.1099* -0.5105* 0.0985* 0.2136* 0.3694* 1 
  
 
0.5253 0.0063 0.5041 0.4602 0.0036 0 0.0003 0.0099 0.009 0 0.0194 0 0 
   
LLPLOAN 0.0932* -0.1363* -0.0972* 0.1403* -0.2014* -0.1116* -0.2058* -0.1220* 0.0016 -0.1111* -0.1500* 0.2814* 0.2807* 0.0285 1 
 
 
0.0285 0.0013 0.0227 0.0009 0 0.0087 0 0.0049 0.9703 0.009 0.0004 0 0 0.5046 
  
CI 0.0963* 0.0618 -0.2642* 0.0081 -0.0306 -0.0471 0.0765* -0.1534* 0.0185 0.1379* -0.1485* -0.2802* -0.2007* -0.2848* 0.0275 1 
 
0.0228 0.1443 0 0.8491 0.4709 0.2665 0.0707 0.0004 0.6619 0.0011 0.0004 0 0 0 0.5201 
 
The table reports correlations for the regressors used the analysis. * indicates significant at 10 per cent level. Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 1. 
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Appendix 3 Sample composition by country in 2014 
Country Number of banks Total asset in 2014 (Euro millions) 
Austria 5 352,100 
Belgium 3 591,467 
Cyprus 2 39,788 
Czech Republic 1 31,296 
Germany 4 2,850,389 
Denmark 5 534,706 
Spain 6 2,567,366 
France 5 5,539,100 
Greece 4 301,115 
Hungary 1 34,694 
Ireland 2 270,500 
Italy 13 2,361,156 
Lithuania 1 852 
Malta 1 7,049 
Netherlands 1 2,998 
Poland 6 147,277 
Portugal 4 231,986 
Romania 1 11,036 
Sweden 5 1,452,367 
United Kingdom 7 6,987,164 
Total 77 24,314,406 
The table shows the number of banks in the sample by country and their size in 2014. 
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